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One of the principles underpinning the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) project is the 
concept of “substance”. Taxation is to be aligned with substance so that profits are being taxed in the 
location where value is created. However, what constitutes “substance” has not been clearly defined. 
This paper seeks to examine the concept of substance as applied in different contexts and attempts to 
put forth a notion of substance that is relevant to Singapore. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
1. The Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) project was conceived by the OECD in 2013 to 
tackle the issue of multinational corporations (“MNCs”) exploiting mismatches in tax rules 
across jurisdictions to reduce their taxable profits or artificially shifting profits to locations 
where they enjoy more favourable tax treatment2.  The project consists of 15 action plans and 
is based broadly on 3 principles – coherence, substance and transparency3:   
a) Coherence - domestic tax rules should be aligned to prevent mismatches that result in 
double non-taxation or excessive deduction of expenses.   
b) Substance – taxing rights should be given to the locations where substantive value-
creating activities are located.   
c) Transparency - there should be greater disclosure of information between taxpayers and 
tax administrators, and among tax administrators. 
 
2. Fundamentally, if the precept is that taxation should be a consequence of the economic 
substance of transactions, then the other 2 principles underpinning the BEPS Action Plan, i.e. 
coherence and transparency, serve to align taxation rules to achieve this outcome. From this 
perspective, substance is the key principle for a rational system of international taxation. 
Indeed, the concept of substance permeates the various action plans, particularly those relating 
to the preferential tax regimes (i.e. use of incentive), the prevention of treaty abuses and 
transfer pricing.  
 
3. Preferential regimes. Work concerning preferential regimes started in the 1990s with the 
publication of an OECD report titled “Harmful Tax Competition – an emerging global issue” in 
1998. The report focuses on preferential regimes that offer no tax or low tax rate for 
geographically mobile activities, for example, financial services and the use of intangibles4. BEPS 
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ACTION 5 “Countering harmful tax practices more effectively, taking into account transparency 
and substance” is in some ways, a continuation of that work. BEPS Action 5 concerns the use of 
preferential tax regime for base erosion and profit shifting activities. The mischiefs it is trying to 
address are artificial profit shifting and a lack of transparency with regard to certain preferential 
regimes5. BEPS Action 5 requires substantive activity for any preferential regime, and that 
taxation is aligned with substance, so that profits are being taxed in the location where value is 
created 6 . Consequently, there must be a demonstrated link between the core activities 
performed and the income qualifying for the concessionary tax treatment under the 
preferential tax regime7. To improve transparency, OECD has proposed to put in place a system 
of exchange of information in respect of rulings relating to preferential tax regimes. 
 
4. Treaty abuses. There were concerns that MNCs were engaging in treaty shopping to minimise 
their tax liabilities. In addition, some MNCs were seen to be artificial breaking up their 
operations into multiple entities operating in different jurisdictions and being able to avoid tax 
by not being regarded as a having a permanent establishment (“PE”) in these locations8. BEPS 
Action 6 “Prevent treaty abuse” and BEPS Action 7 “Prevent the artificial avoidance of PE status” 
thus look into tightening treaty provisions to prevent the granting of treaty benefits in certain 
situations. The recommendations under BEPS Actions 6 and 7 are mostly in the form of specific 
treaty rules that would provide new or revised objective thresholds for entitlement to treaty 
benefits or source taxation of business profits respectively, and not, for instance, some general 
rule to disregard legal arrangements in favour of some notion of economic substance. This is 
understandable since there would be a need to reduce ambiguity in the application of a treaty. 
Nevertheless, the underlying concerns reflected by BEPS Actions 6 and 7 are with artificial 
arrangements that seek to exploit existing treaty rules. While the response is to recalibrate such 
objective treaty rules, the underlying problem is the ability of abusive taxpayers to put in place 
of legal arrangements that are perceived to be artificial in relation to the economic realities of 
those arrangements. 
 
5. Transfer pricing. Transfer pricing is perceived as an area where MNCs could manipulate legal 
arrangements to achieve favourable tax outcomes. Transfer pricing rules, based on the arm’s 
length principle, serve to allocate the profits of an MNC among the jurisdictions in which it 
operates. In some cases, particularly where use of intangibles or mobile assets is concerned, 
the OECD is of the view that the existing rules may have been misapplied to shift income to low-
tax jurisdictions9. This could happen when the location where the income is booked is separated 
from the location where the income-generating activities are performed. This is more likely to 
occur for transactions between related parties. Transfer pricing rules have always sought to 
align transfer prices with the economic substance of transactions and are perhaps emblematic 
of the difficulties and subjectivity involved in doing so. Due perhaps to the scope for contention 
and the sense that multinational enterprises have successfully exploited the subjectivity of such 
rules, the re-examination of transfer pricing rules was an important aspect of the BEPS project. 
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To ensure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation, BEPS Actions 8, 9 and 
10 studied and recommended rules to inhibit the artificial shifting of profits among group 
entities using transfer pricing rules. Action 8 focuses on rules governing the transfer of 
intangibles; Action 9 targets the transfer of risks among or the allocation of capital to entities 
within the group; and Action 10 concerns other transactions that seemingly pose high-risk of 
profit shifting, such as the use of management fees or head office expenses to erode the tax 
base. Although the recommendations arising from BEPS Actions 8, 9 and 10 do not 
fundamentally change existing transfer pricing principles, there is now clearer 
acknowledgement that some legal arrangements should not be recognised for transfer pricing 
purposes if they do not possess “the commercial rationality of arrangements that would be 
agreed between unrelated parties under comparable economic circumstances”10. 
 
6. As explained, underpinning the above is the principle that the tax outcome should not be 
divorced from the substance of the transaction. Profits should be taxed where the economic 
activities generating the profits are conducted and aligned to the location where value is 
created. However, what constitutes “substance” has not been clearly expressed in the BEPS 
reports. In this regard, it is important for us to articulate a concept of substance this is relevant 
for Singapore’s purposes. This forms the basis of our evaluation as to whether our domestic tax 
rules are aligned to the international tax principles, and whether the companies operating in 
Singapore could withstand scrutiny in light of the substance requirement found under the 
various international tax rules. 
 
7. This paper examines the concept of substance as applied in both tax and non-tax contexts. 
These include how substance is applied in domestic tax concepts concerning residence and 
permanent establishment, how it is applied in anti-avoidance rules, in treaty provisions and 
transfer pricing rules, and how it is featured in accounting and economic concepts. With the 
understanding, the paper proposes a set of indicators that could be used to measure the extent 
of existence of substance in a business or corporate structure. 
 
What is “substance”?  
 
(A) Concept of substance in residence test  
 
8. Tax residence establishes the nexus between a taxable person and a tax jurisdiction, and confers 
a right on the jurisdiction to impose tax on the person11. There are primarily two tests of 
residence: the incorporation test which looks at the place of incorporation and the control and 
management test which determines place of residence based on whether central management 
and control actually abides12.  For this purpose, central management and control is assumed to 
be situated in the place where the board of directors exercises the power and authority vested 
in it by the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Company. This refers to that the 
highest level of control, where strategic decisions are made. The test is however premised on a 
particular view of corporate governance that existed in simpler times, and may be argued to be 
rather antiquated in view of modern multinational corporate governance models. For example, 
it is highly questionable in a publicly listed company with a US or UK styled model of corporate 
governance whether it is the board of directors that makes the key decisions concerning the 
company’s business. Realistically, the board would make decisions based on the 
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PricewaterhouseCoopers 
12 per Lord Loreburn, De Beers Consolidated Mines v. Howe Ltd (Surveyor of Taxes) (1906) 5 TC 198 
recommendations of the company’s executives who would be more aware of the actual 
circumstances of the company’s business and finances. Furthermore, in a multinational 
corporate structure, the directors of a foreign subsidiary may be nominees or may have no 
independence from group strategies and policies - does it then follow that the subsidiary must 
be resident in the jurisdiction of the group headquarters? 
 
9. The incorporation test is simple to administer and provides certainty. However, it can be easily 
manipulated and opens up opportunities for tax abuse. For example, the Apple group was able 
to exploit the differences in the US and Ireland corporate residence tests such that its Irish 
subsidiaries claimed tax residence nowhere 13 . Consequently, their incomes were taxed 
nowhere.  
 
10. While the control and management test may seem to sit better with the concept of substance, 
as explained, it also lacks a satisfactory logical basis (at least when it is tied solely to the board 
of directors of the company).  A company engaged in real activity generally has at least three 
levels of management: shop-floor or frontline management; day-to-day operations; and senior 
management14.  A  control and management test that takes into account the various levels of 
management of a company may be a better indicator of genuine economic connection with a 
jurisdiction, upon which the taxing right of that jurisdiction could be established15. 
 
(B) Concept of substance in the tax treatment for hybrid financial instruments 
 
11. Hybrid financial instrument refers to a financial instrument that has both debt and equity 
features. The issue posed by hybrid financial instrument is in its classification, which in turn 
determines the nature of the distribution from the instrument, i.e. whether it is dividend or 
interest. Due to the differing tax treatment for dividend and interest, there is a need to provide 
certainty on the classification rules for hybrid financial instruments. 
 
12. For this reason, IRAS has published an e-Tax guide titled “Income Tax Treatment of Hybrid 
Instruments”. It is stated in the guide that, in determining the characterisation of a hybrid 
instrument such as redeemable preference shares, the Comptroller of Income Tax takes the 
approach that the characterisation is first determined based on its legal form. This involves an 
examination of the legal rights and obligations created by the instrument. However, where the 
legal form of a hybrid instrument is not indicative of or do not reflect the economic obligations 
and rights, the characterisation of the hybrid instrument would be determined based on facts 
and circumstances16. In this regard, the analysis is first a factual and legal one. The notion of 
substance will then be applied to determine the degree of congruence between the legal form 
and the reality (i.e. the substance) the legal form purports to represent. But, what is the 
“reality”? 
 
                                                          
13 Sheppard L., 28 May 2013, How Does Apple Avoid Taxes, Forbes, retrieved from 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/leesheppard/2013/05/28/how-does-apple-avoid-taxes/ (accessed on 7 July 2016). 
14 Axel Smits and Isabel Verlinden, 2012, Substance 2.0 -  Aligning international tax planning with today’s business realities, 
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16  IRAS, 19 May 2014, Income Tax Treatment of Hybrid Instruments, retrieved from 
https://www.iras.gov.sg/irashome/uploadedFiles/IRASHome/e-
Tax_Guides/etaxguide_CIT_Income%20Tax%20treatment%20of%20Hybrid%20Instruments_2014-05-19.pdf (accessed on 
27 June 2016)  
13. Perhaps, guidance can be inferred from the bifurcation approach that some other countries 
adopt to address the hybridity of certain financial instruments. Bifurcation involves the division 
of a financial instrument into its embedded debt and equity element respectively17. Instead of 
taking a cubby-hole approach and forcing an instrument into either the debt or equity 
classification, the bifurcation approach looks at the expected and unexpected gains and losses 
associated with the basic building blocks that made up the financial instrument18. It segregates 
the expected time-value return in an instrument from the unexpected gain or loss in value of 
the instrument, and applies the relevant tax treatment to the two parts respectively. By doing 
so, taxation is better aligned with the economic consequences that are brought about by the 
financial instrument. In this way, the reality or substance of a transaction is to be found in its 
“economic equivalence”.  
 
14. While an approach based on economic equivalence would be theoretically more coherent and 
consistent, IRAS’ approach reflects an attitude of administrative pragmatism to take the legal 
arrangement as the default position. It would be for a party (more likely IRAS since the taxpayer 
has chosen the particular legal arrangement) to assert that the economic substance of the 
arrangement is something different – this improves predictability and certainty of tax outcomes 
for taxpayers. In contrast, a bifurcation approach would involve the taxpayer in subjective and 
possibly needless financial and economic analyses of every financial instrument. 
 
(C) Concept of substance as applied in anti-avoidance cases 
 
15. The notion of “substance over form”, i.e. looking at the economic realities instead of legal 
relationships or arrangements, is very relevant in the area of addressing tax avoidance. 
 
16. Tax is essentially a creature of statute. Traditionally, the tax courts in the United Kingdom (“UK”) 
had adopted a literal approach to interpreting tax law. In fact, a taxpayer’s right to arrange his 
affairs in such a manner to minimise his tax liability was endorsed by the courts19. In IRC v Duke 
of Westminster [1936] AC 120, the Court also opined that it could not ignore the legal position 
and regard the substance of the matter.  In their view, the substance was “that which results 
from the legal rights and obligations of the parties ascertained upon ordinary legal principles”. 
As such, even though the arrangement was clearly intended to result in a tax benefit for the 
taxpayer, the taxpayer is entitled to do so. 
 
17. However, such a literal interpretation of the law has facilitated the use of convoluted and highly 
artificial tax planning schemes. As such, beginning with WT Ramsay Ltd v IRC [1981] All ER 865, 
the House of Lords began to address tax avoidance structures. Initially, the approach was more 
circumscribed and appeared to be directed at arrangements with self-cancelling steps (as in 
Ramsay), but later this was clarified to be an application of a purposive interpretation of the 
law21. There was a paradigm shift in the view the courts viewed tax arrangements - the courts 
                                                          
17 Tim Edgar, 2000, Chapter 6 Bifurcation and the Taxation of Hybrid Instruments, The Income Tax Treatment of Financial 
Instruments: Theory and Practice, Canadian Tax Paper No.105, Canadian Tax Foundation, pp. 243 -311 
18 Tim Edgar, 2000, Chapter 6 Bifurcation and the Taxation of Hybrid Instruments, The Income Tax Treatment of Financial 
Instruments: Theory and Practice, Canadian Tax Paper No.105, Canadian Tax Foundation, pp. 243 -311 
19 Per Lord President Clyde in Ayrshire Pullman Motor Services v IRC (1929) 14 TC 754 
20 In this case, the Duke executed deeds with persons then employed by him. Under the deeds, they will receive weekly sums 
for a period of seven years or the joint lives of the parties.  Previously, these recipients were receiving fixed wages. After the 
execution of the deeds, they remained employed by the Duke and the amount payable to them under the deeds will be 
exactly the same as the wages they received before the deeds. The issue was whether the payments made under the deeds 
were remuneration for services or annual payments. If the sums were annual payments and not remuneration for services, 
the Duke would be allowed a deduction against his liability to surtax. The Lords held that the payments were not 
remuneration for services.  
21  Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Mawson [2005] 1 All ER 97 
began to look at the substance of an arrangement as a whole rather than just the words and 
deeds of the individual transactions forming part of the arrangement. In applying the purposive 
interpretation, the courts also considered the intent of the Parliament when the rules were 
legislated. Nevertheless, the application of a purposive interpretation of the law has proven 
deficient in tackling arrangements that are not illegal, but often convoluted or artificial. 
 
18. To further rein in the unacceptable tax planning activities, the UK introduced its first general 
anti-abuse rule (“GAAR”) in 2013. It is meant to be a narrowly focused anti-abuse rule targeting 
abusive tax avoidance schemes. It rejects the approach taken by the courts in a past that 
taxpayers are entitled to reduce their tax bills by whatever lawful means. Rather, the enjoyment 
of a tax benefit needs to be within the boundaries contemplated by the Parliament, and the 
obtaining of a tax advantage should not have been the main purpose, or one of the main 
purposes, for putting in place the relevant arrangements22. To establish whether the obtaining 
of a tax advantage was the main purpose or one of the main purposes, it is to be proven that 
the transaction which would otherwise have occurred has been redesigned, or has been 
entered into under different terms and conditions, in order to change appreciably the tax result 
that would otherwise have resulted, and where that favourable tax outcome is itself a 
substantial objective 23 . In this way, the notion of “substance” encompasses not only the 
economic effect of the transaction, but also the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
conduct of the transaction. 
 
19. While there is no GAAR per se in the US, the US judiciary has created a number of anti-avoidance 
doctrines: (a) the “business purpose” doctrine, which examines the purpose of a transaction; 
(b) the “economic substance” doctrine, which looks at a taxpayer’s economic position; (c) the 
“step transaction” doctrine, which disregards interconnected steps that have no significance for 
tax purposes by consolidating these into a single transaction; and (d) the “substance-over-form” 
doctrine, which disregards the legal form of a transaction in favour of its underlying economic 
substance.  
 
20. The US economic substance doctrine is legislated under section 7701(o) of the Internal Revenue 
Code. Under this section, the transaction shall be treated as having economic substance only if 
“(a) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the 
taxpayer’s economic position, and (b) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from 
Federal income tax effects) for entering into such transaction”. The first limb requires an 
objective analysis of the taxpayer’s economic position before and after the transaction, whilst 
the second limb focuses on the motive of the taxpayer for entering into the transaction.  
 
21. It is noted that the “meaningful” standard differs from the “possibility of profit” test. The test 
recognises that businesses may undertake transactions that do not produce an identifiable 
income stream in isolation, for example, transactions relating to corporate restructuring24. In 
addition, it is not necessary for the taxpayer to show the pre-tax profit of a transaction to 
demonstrate its substance. However, where the potential for profit is relied upon by the 
taxpayer as a measure of substance, the taxpayer has to show that the expected pre-tax return 
is significant compared to the expected tax benefits.25 
 
                                                          
22  HMRC, Tax avoidance: General Anti-Abuse Rule, retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/topic/dealing-with-hmrc/tax-
avoidance (accessed on 7 July 2016) 
23  HMRC, Tax avoidance: General Anti-Abuse Rule, retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/topic/dealing-with-hmrc/tax-
avoidance (accessed on 7 July 2016) 
24 McMahon Jr., 16 August 2010, Living with the Codified Economic Substance Doctrine, Tax Notes, Vol. 128, pp. 731-754 
25 Robert McMechan, 2013, Economic Substance and Tax Avoidance: An International Perspective, Carswell, pp. 218. 
22. A number of civil law countries, like Spain and Brazil, have similarly applied doctrines developed 
by their judiciaries to counter tax avoidance. These doctrines are: “simulation”, “abuse of form”, 
“abuse of law” and “fraus legis” (Alvarrenga, 2013) 26. Relying on such doctrines require the 
court to adopt a more purposive interpretation of the tax statute, and to investigate into the 
economic reality behind the legal form adopted by the taxpayer. 
 
23. On a more practical level, a doctrine or principle of “substance over form” can only operate on 
an abstract conceptual level. Without more, such a doctrine would fail to provide sufficient 
clarity as to the correct outcome in particular cases. In many anti-avoidance regimes, for 
example Australia’s Part IVA and the equivalent provision in Hong Kong, the operation of the 
anti-avoidance rule requires the comparison of the actual legal arrangement entered into by 
the taxpayer with a hypothetical alternative arrangement that would achieve the same 
economic or commercial outcome for the taxpayer. Any comparative tax advantage that is 
obtained through the taxpayer’s legal arrangement (as opposed to the hypothetical alternative 
arrangement) is then reversed. 
 
24. In Singapore, we have our general anti-avoidance rule legislated under section 33 of the 
Singapore Income Tax Act (Chapter 134) (“ITA”) 27. In the case Comptroller of Income Tax v AQQ 
and another appeal [2014] SGCA 1528, the Court of Appeal held that for the Singapore GAAR to 
apply to an arrangement, the court will first determine whether the arrangement results in tax 
advantage of the type as specified under section 33(1) of the ITA (e.g. an alteration of incidence 
of tax or a reduction in tax liability). If it does, then the court will examine if the exception under 
section 33(3)(b) for arrangements with bona fide commercial reasons applies. In addition, the 
court will consider whether the use of specific provisions in the ITA to achieve the relevant tax 
advantage is within the intent and purpose of the Parliament in legislating those provisions.  
Objectively, the first step of this three-step step is easily met since it depends only on the 
                                                          
26 Simulation is essentially equivalent to the common law concept of “sham”, and occurs when the intention of the parties 
is different from the arrangement that the parties purport to make. Abuse of form involves the use of an atypical, abnormal 
or unnecessary legal form by the taxpayer to perform a juridical act, which, if carried out through a “normal” form, would 
have a more burdensome tax treatment. Abuse of law is the improper exercise of a right. Fraus legis corresponds to an 
indirect violation of the law, in which the taxpayer observes the literal content of the law, but to achieve a result contrary to 
its spirit. 
27 Section 33 of the Income Tax Act: 
(1)  Where the Comptroller is satisfied that the purpose or effect of any arrangement is directly or indirectly — (a) to alter 
the incidence of any tax which is payable by or which would otherwise have been payable by any person; (b) to relieve any 
person from any liability to pay tax or to make a return under this Act; or (c) to reduce or avoid any liability imposed or which 
would otherwise have been imposed on any person by this Act, the Comptroller may, without prejudice to such validity as it 
may have in any other respect or for any other purpose, disregard or vary the arrangement and make such adjustments as 
he considers appropriate, including the computation or recomputation of gains or profits, or the imposition of liability to tax, 
so as to counteract any tax advantage obtained or obtainable by that person from or under that arrangement… 
… 
(3)  This section shall not apply to — (a) any arrangement made or entered into before 29th January 1988; or (b) any 
arrangement carried out for bona fide commercial reasons and had not as one of its main purposes the avoidance or 
reduction of tax.  
28 The case concerns the restructuring of a group of companies through the incorporation of a new entity, AQQ, and 
transferring the shares of a number of subsidiary companies to AQQ. The intention of the restructuring is to utilise the 
imputation credits that the group companies have accumulated under the then-existing imputation system for corporate tax 
purposes. To finance the restructuring, a fixed rate notes was obtained from a bank. Through a circuitous series of payment 
arrangements, the principal amount of the notes was repaid to the bank within the same day, and interest payments were 
generated. AQQ claimed a deduction for such interest expenses against the dividends paid by the subsidiary companies, and 
in the process, obtained a substantial amount of tax refund. In the absence of any cogent explanation for the complex 
arrangement (with round tripping of the purchase price of subsidiaries and artificial interposition of external entities when 
the group has sufficient resources to finance the restructuring), the Court of Appeal ruled that the Comptroller of Income 
Tax was entitled to invoke section 33 to disregard the whole arrangement.  
existence of a tax advantage. The notion of “substance” enters the analysis through the second 
step in the consideration of the commercial reasons of the taxpayer.   
 
25. In summary, in the context of tax avoidance, the determination of substance involves an 
analysis of the economic realities, the commercial considerations and justifications pertaining 
to an arrangement. This analysis also has to take into account general tax principles and an 
appreciation of policy objectives and Parliament’s intent behind the legislation of the tax 
provisions.  
 
(D) Concept of substance in tax treaties 
 
26. In the area of tax treaties, the concept of substance can be manifested in the beneficial 
ownership requirement to some extent. As already explained, the concept is also implicit in the 
tax residence requirements under domestic law – however, for many countries with worldwide 
taxation, this is largely secondary since the key question is whether the country of residence 
asserts a right to tax the income of the taxpayer, and not whether the taxpayer has business 
activities in that country. 
 
27. Beneficial ownership is to be contrasted with legal ownership. The concept of “beneficial 
ownership” is based on a broad economic, rather than a strict legal interpretation of the term 
“ownership”29. It is based on the principle of “substance over form”: though the legal title to a 
property rests with the legal owner, the beneficial owner is the one who is entitled to receive 
the income from the property. In this way, the concept corresponds to the notion of substance, 
as it evaluates the economic realities of the underlying transactions.  
 
28. The beneficial ownership requirement can be found in Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention, concerning the treatment of interest, dividend and royalty. It aims to minimise 
treaty abuses and seeks to accord treaty benefits only to recipients who are the true owners of 
the income. In this respect, in order to be eligible for treaty benefits, the recipient of an income 
must not be a conduit merely acting on behalf of another person30. To be regarded as the 
“beneficial owner” of an income, the recipient of the income should have the right to use and 
enjoy the income, free from any obligations to pass on the same to another person31.  Implicit 
in this concept is an assumption of the beneficial owner of the income as a “free” economic 
actor with financial and commercial independence from other parties in relation to the income. 
 
29. The judge in the Canadian case of Prevost Car Inc v Her Majesty the Queen [2008] TCC 231 
shared OECD’s view on beneficial ownership: “the ‘beneficial owner’ of dividends is the person 
who receives the dividends for his or her own use and enjoyment and assumes the risk and 
control of the dividend he or she received. The person who is beneficial owner of the dividend 
is the person who enjoys and assumes all the attributes of ownership”. In the case of Velcro 
Canada Inc. v Her Majesty the Queen [2012] TCC 57, the Canadian courts further put forth the 
following fours factors to determine the existence beneficial ownership: 
a) Possession – “having or holding property in one’s power” or “the exercise of dominion 
over property”. 
b) Use – “a long continued possession or employment of a thing for which it is adapted”. 
                                                          
29 Axel Smits and Isabel Verlinden, 2012, Substance 2.0 - Aligning international tax planning with today’s business realities, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
30 OECD, 2014, 2014 Update to the OECD Model Tax Convention, retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/2014-
update-model-tax-concention.pdf (accessed on 7 July 2016) 
31 OECD, 2014, 2014 Update to the OECD Model Tax Convention, retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/2014-
update-model-tax-concention.pdf (accessed on 7 July 2016) 
c) Risk – “the chance of injury, damage or loss”, or “liability for injury, damage or loss that 
occurs 
d) Control – “to exercise power or influence over”. 
 
30. Some countries apply the requirement for beneficial ownership in a broader manner akin to an 
anti-avoidance device. For example, in China’s State Administration of Taxation (“SAT”) Notice 
601 issued on 27 Oct 2009, a “beneficial owner” is stated to generally engage in substantive 
operational activities and excludes “agents” and “conduit companies”.  A “conduit company” is 
defined as a company established for minimising taxes, or transferring profits, established only 
for tax avoidance reasons. Manufacturing, distribution or management are given as examples 
of substantive operational activities.32 
 
31. The SAT Notice 601 also pointed out some factors that would be considered as contrary to claim 
of beneficial ownership. These include an obligation to distribute or assign all or majority of the 
receipt within a specified time limit to a person who is resident in another country, an absence 
of operational activities other than holding the property or rights based on which the income is 
derived, and the existence of few assets or headcount that appears disproportionate to the 
amount of income. 33 
 
(E) Concept of substance in transfer pricing 
 
32. The concept of economic substance features prominently in the application of the arm’s length 
method in transfer pricing. According to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations 2010 (“OECD TP Guidelines 2010”)34, the arm’s length basis 
requires a comparison of the conditions in a controlled transaction with the conditions in 
transactions between independent enterprises. In order for such comparisons to be useful, the 
“economically relevant characteristics of the situations being compare must be sufficiently 
comparable”. This requires a functional analysis which seeks to identify and compare the 
“economically significant activities and responsibilities undertaken, assets used and risks 
assumed” by the parties to the transactions. 
 
33. However, one of the criticisms for the OECD TP Guidelines 2010 is that its analysis focuses on 
the contractual allocation of functions, assets and risks, which could be easily manipulated. The 
application of the arm’s length principle in such a situation may not lead to a tax outcome that 
is aligned with the conduct of substantive economic activities or the creation of value35. 
 
34. BEPS Actions 8, 9 and 10 thus aimed to strengthen and enhance the guidance in this area, and 
to ensure that the application of arm’s length principle will result in an outcome that aligns the 
allocation of profits to the underlying economic activities. In the Aligning Transfer Pricing 
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Outcomes with Value Creation, Actions 8-10 - 2015 Final Reports36, OECD proposed that the 
actual contractual relations between related parties should be examined together with the 
conduct of the parties. In this regard, the parties’ conduct is generally regarded as the best 
evidence concerning the true allocation of risk and the functions assumed by the parties. The 
actual consequence of the supposed risk allocation is another factor to be considered in 
examining the economic substance of the allocation. In order to arrive at the appropriate tax 
outcome, where the contractual terms of an arrangement and the conduct of the related parties 
differ significantly or the contractual terms are not supported by actual conduct, it is possible 
to disregard the contract terms and apply the transfer pricing rules based on the actual conduct 
of the parties.37  
 
35. Accordingly, in the context of transfer pricing, the concept of substance is to be found in the 
conduct of the parties and the economic consequences of the relevant transaction. The actual 
conduct of the parties and the substance of the transaction involved are the key tests in 
allocating profits arising from the transaction to the respective parties38. 
 
36. The Australia Tax Office, in its Tax Ruling 2014/639, provided the following views, which aptly 
described how “substance” is being evaluated in the context of transfer pricing:  
 
“[Transfer pricing] is concerned with the conditions and profits resulting from the commercial or 
financial relations between associated enterprises, not merely with the particular labels 
assigned to those relations. The form chosen to document a transaction or arrangement does 
not necessarily dictate its substance, or whether it is commercially rational, or inform as to 
whether it has been undertaken at arm’s length. In applying the arm’s length principle, it is 
important to consider the economic reality and effect of a transaction or arrangement (that is, 
its substance), rather than proceeding only on the basis of how it has been characterised or 
structured… Consequently, a key consideration is whether the transaction or arrangement 
conveys economic value from one enterprise to another – whether that benefit derives from 
tangible property, intangibles, services or other items or activities. An arm’s length party will be 
willing to pay for an activity only to the extent that the activity confers on it a benefit of economic 
or commercial value… The ‘substance’ of the commercial or financial relations describes the 
economic reality or essence of those dealings and is determined by examining all of the relevant 
facts and circumstances, such as the economic and commercial context of the commercial or 
financial relations, the object and economic and financial effects of those relations from a 
practical and business point of view on each of the entities and the conduct of the parties, 
including the functions performed, assets used and risks assumed by them.”  
 
(F) Concept of substance as applied in the context of incentive administration 
 
37. Tax policy has been an important tool to achieve economic growth and development for 
Singapore. Being a small city state with limited natural resources, Singapore needs to have a tax 
system that supports its economic and social development, and provides sustainable revenue 
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for the country. Besides keeping its tax rates competitive, Singapore uses tax incentives to 
promote investments in specific industries or activities, with the objective of generating 
economic spinoffs and delivering long term economic outcomes. 
 
38. Singapore’s use of tax incentives is in principle aligned with the concept that profits should be 
taxed where substantive economic activities generating the profits are performed and where 
value is created40. Tax incentives are awarded to a small group of companies for a defined time 
period. To be eligible for tax incentive, a company must commit to conducting substantive 
economic activities in Singapore and add significant value to the economy. Such commitments 
could be in the form of creating sizeable number of professional or skilled jobs for Singaporeans, 
incurring considerable business spending, including infrastructure spending, in Singapore, and 
also bringing in new capabilities into Singapore41. Companies being awarded with incentives are 
subject to regular checks of their contributions and are expected to be compliant with the 
Singapore tax rules. 
 
39. For instance, criteria relating to the headquarters incentives could include the following: 
a) The applicant should be, or belong to a group that is, well established in its respective 
business sector or industry and has attained a critical size in terms of equity, assets, 
employees and business share. 
b) The applicant should be the nerve centre in terms of organisation reporting structure at 
senior management levels for its principal activities with clear-cut management and 
control for the activities. 
c) The applicant should have a substantial level of headquarters activities in Singapore that 
may include, amongst other things, strategic business planning and development, general 
management and administration, marketing control and brand management, intellectual 
property management and research and development activities. 
d) The personnel employed by the applicant for its headquarters operations should be 
based in Singapore, and would include management, professionals, technical personnel 
and other supporting staff. 
Some additional factors that may be considered include the amount of paid-up capital the 
company has, the percentage of skilled staff, and the quantum of business spending.   
 
40. In this way, “substance” is to be assessed in the scope and extent of activities the company 
carried out or has brought into Singapore, and the level of economic contributions the company 
made to Singapore. 
 
(G) Concept of substance in accounting and economics 
 
41. Let us now examine how the notion of substance is applied in areas beyond tax. Similar to tax 
principles, accounting concepts are human constructs. They are formulated to meet the 
information needs of the owners of corporate entities. Accounting principles, and the general 
accepted accounting standards, govern the way financial information should be measured and 
represented so as to present a true and fair view of the financial situation of a company.  
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42. Accounting profit is generally defined as the difference between total monetary revenue and 
total monetary costs42. Monetary revenue refers to the revenue the company receives from the 
provision of its goods or services. Monetary costs are explicit costs the company has to incur in 
running the business operations. Examples of such costs are purchase of stocks, employee 
salaries, and utilities.  
 
43. However, to economists, “profit” should include not only monetary revenue and costs, but also 
implicit gains and implicit costs43. In economics terms, implicit costs refer to opportunity costs, 
that is, what the company has forgone in order to use its resources in a particular manner. For 
example, the implicit cost from using an asset is the potential price the company could obtain 
from selling it. Economic profit is generally considered as a better indication of whether a 
company should enter or exit a market as it takes into account all the costs involved in a business 
operation44. Hence, it is arguably a better representation of “substance” of the business. 
 
44. Another area where we could see the concept of substance being applied is in the area of 
“control”. Traditionally, for financial statement consolidation purposes, “control” is presumed 
to exist where there is a shareholding of 50% or more. As such, where an investor company 
holds 50% of more of the shares in another entity (the investee), it is required to prepare 
consolidated financial statements.  
 
45. However, as commerce and economy develops, and corporate structures getting increasingly 
complex, a simplistic definition based on the percentage of ownership is no longer sufficient. 
Financial Reporting Standard 110 on Consolidated Financial Statements (effective for annual 
periods beginning on or after 1 January 2014)45 pronounced that the existence of control is to 
be evaluated based on the following factors:  
a) whether the investor has power over the investee; 
b) whether the investor is exposed to or has rights to variable returns from its investment; 
and  
c) whether the investor has an ability to use its power over the investee to affect the 
amount of the investor’s returns.  
 
46. Where all of the three factors are present, an investor is regarded to have control over the 
investee and is required to present consolidated financial statement with the investee. For the 
purpose of determining whether the investor has power over the investee, one has to examine 
whether the investor has any rights that give it the ability to direct the activities of the investee. 
Such rights exist not only in the form of voting rights, but may also arise from contractual 
relationships.  In this way, accounting standard is increasingly looking into the substance of the 
relationship between the two entities. Instead of relying on a bright line test, for accounting 
purposes, one is now required to examine the facts, circumstances and the conduct of the 
parties in the arrangement. 
 
(H) Concept of substance in the context of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing 
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47. Corporate vehicles may be used by criminals to conceal or disguise the proceeds from crime. In 
the area of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing, to deter and detect the 
misuse of corporate vehicles, it is important to have access to information relating to the 
persons who can exercise ultimate effective control over the corporate vehicles46. The concepts 
applied here is the concept of beneficial ownership and the concept of control. Beneficial owner 
refers to the natural person who ultimately owns the corporate vehicle or the natural person 
on whose behalf a transaction is being conducted47. For this purpose, it looks beyond the legal 
ownership and takes into account how control is actually being exercised and the identity of the 
person who benefits from the transaction in effect. In this manner, similar to the discussion 
above on tax treaties and the accounting concept of control, substance is to be found not in the 
legal form but the economic realities of an arrangement. 
  
The significance of substance 
 
48. From the above survey, it may be surmised that the notion of “substance” is used in three 
different ways: 
a) Substance as a threshold – the notion of substance is embedded in some threshold test 
producing a binary outcome, for example, a taxpayer is either resident or not, a hybrid 
instrument is either analysed based on its legal form or not, a tax arrangement is either 
based on commercial motives or not, a taxpayer is either the beneficial owner of income 
or not;  
b) Substance as a measure – the notion of substance is reflected in a requirement for 
proportionality, which is most commonly found in transfer pricing principles and is also 
reflected in calibrated levels of different tax incentives; and 
c) Substance as a guide – the notion of substance is left nebulous as a guiding principle 
intended to be used in a broad range of situations but with no prescriptive consequence, 
for example the use of the concept of substance in the accounting  and economic sense. 
 
49. We consider the utility of each of these in the Singapore context and whether any useful 
overarching principle may be drawn therefrom to form the basis of a general rule. 
 
(A) Substance as a threshold 
 
50. This usage is the most common in tax rules since the object is to produce a practical outcome. 
However, the binary nature of the possible outcome presents three related conceptual 
difficulties. Firstly, this results in the effective setting of an all-or-nothing threshold and it may 
be difficult for the analysis to properly give weight to different factors in a factual matrix. If the 
rule is used sparingly (e.g. the anti-avoidance rule), this problem is ameliorated insofar as a 
more considered judgment is applied, but where the rule is often used (e.g. the residence test, 
the beneficial ownership test), the practical consequence may be that the threshold would be 
set at a low level to avoid disputes. Secondly, the level of threshold needs to be set and it may 
be difficult to do so across the entire spectrum of business taxpayers – what is meaningful 
substance for one taxpayer may well be an insignificant trifle for another. Thirdly, there may be 
a lack of proportionality of outcomes as the taxpayer either satisfies the rule or not – there is 
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no allowance for how slightly the taxpayer may have failed to meet the rule. Again, in a 
commonly applied rule, there would be practical pressure to set a low threshold to avoid 
inequitable outcomes resulting from such a cliffhanging effect. In some rules however, there is 
scope for a two stage analysis – a first stage to reflect a threshold test, i.e. whether a tax 
arrangement is tax avoidance or not, followed by a second stage to reflect a proportionate 
outcome, i.e. the adjustment made to a tax avoidance arrangement would be proportionate to 
the tax advantage obtained. 
 
51. Notwithstanding these limitations, the setting of a threshold is practical for both compliance by 
taxpayers and administration by the tax authority. The mix of relevant factors that is considered 
in such a threshold test is of course peculiar to the object of the test. That said, the factors are 
invariably concerned with facts that are indicators of commercial or economic realities and that 
are objectively ascertainable or verifiable.  
 
(B) Substance as a measure 
 
52. As a general rule, for a business to be deemed to exist, we would expect there to be a proper 
set-up established to conduct regular and organised activities to derive a profit. Substance, in 
this context, is generally demonstrated in the size of the operation. A business is regarded as 
substantial if it employs a sizeable amount of resources and generates significant economic 
benefits (in terms of revenue or contributions). Factors that could be relevant in this analysis 
include: 
a) The duration of the operation/ the degree of permanence of the set-up; 
b) The nature of the activities conducted and the control the entity has over the conduct of 
these activities; 
c) The nature and quantum of assets and capital employed in the operation, having regard 
to the type of activities carried out by business; 
d) The degree of influence the entity has in the market or the economy, for example, its 
market share or its ability to tap into the capital market; 
e) Its economic contributions in terms of business spending, use of banking facilities and the 
creation of jobs; and 
f) Its contribution to the value chain, taking into account its relationship with the other 
entities that may be providing support to the operation, for example, its distributing 
agents or marketing agents. 
 
53. In tax matters that require alignment of outcomes to commercial realities in a more calibrated 
manner, for example transfer pricing and tax incentives, the notion of substance can be 
shorthand for the measure against which the tax outcome is to be determined. While such a 
rule theoretically provides an outcome that is more consistent with commercial realities, it too 
suffers significant limitations. Firstly, given the myriad factors that may be relevant in different 
businesses or commercial transactions, the analysis is not linear but multifactorial. This means 
that there will be multiple dimensions of subjectivity involved in the articulation and application 
of the tax rule. Secondly, in transfer pricing situations, the substance of business operations 
only provides one aspect of the transfer pricing analysis and not the whole tax outcome – it 
would still be necessary to attribute the correct value to such substance. In other words, the 
existence of substance by no means eliminates the subjectivity and contention involved in 
transfer pricing analyses.       
 
(C) Substance as a guide 
 
54. The use of the notion of substance in this sense is not to produce administrative rules but to 
articulate a guiding principle. For the purposes of tax rules and tax administration, we think that 
this would be of limited usefulness. Such a guiding principle would not be definite enough to 
provide predictability of tax outcomes or to guide the resolution of tax disputes. 
 
Conclusion 
 
55. As can be seen from above discussion, the recent development in international tax rules could 
be regarded as a search for “substance” and the alignment of tax outcome with substance. In 
this context, it is no longer sufficient to have “substance” as a vague guiding principle or a simple 
threshold test. The concept of substance as used in the above sense requires a measure of 
economic realities in order to resolve international tax issues by some norm justified by some 
concept of proportionality. Such an analysis would necessarily be a multi-faceted and subjective 
one. In this sense, it is doubtful whether there will ever be a consensus internationally on what 
constitutes substance or an acceptable level of substance, and the implementation of this 
principle would not be void of conflicts.    
 
 
